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Can Literature Know Itself and Not
Become Philosophy?
Ralph M. Berry
“[…] in a modern era intellectual works with
designs upon the most serious attention of their
culture must give themselves out as, or allow
themselves to be appropriated as, philosophies.”
Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason (1979b xxi)
1  I  want  to  begin  by  acknowledging  an unusual  characteristic  of  both  literature  and
philosophy, namely, that no one seems to know what either is—or at least that no one
seems able to say what either is, or not with any authority, when the concept of either
is  questioned.  Part  of  what  I  have  in  mind  is  the  divide  between  philosophy’s
continental and Anglo-American versions, a depth of disagreement that philosophers
seem  able  to  explain  only  tendentiously,  that  is,  by  aligning  themselves  with  one
version  against  the  other.  And  my  other  point  of  reference  is  literary  criticism’s
disenchantment with poetics, by which I mean the attempt to abstract the constituents
of literariness from their various historical manifestations, whether we consider this
project in the terms of structural linguistics, the American New Criticism, or aesthetic
theory generally. In both cases, a limit on our knowledge, or perhaps on our ability to
express what we know, seems to have been confronted, and even if these limits are now
familiar,  I  don’t think they are very well  understood. When in his 1932 essay, “The
Elimination of Metaphysics through the Logical Analysis of Language,” Rudolf Carnap
criticizes  Heidegger’s  philosophy,  he  does  not  simply  accuse  Heidegger  of  making
mistakes. He accuses him of being no philosopher at all, of uttering sentences that are
cognitively meaningless; and when in “Reiterating the Difference” in 1977 John Searle
charges  Derrida  with  obscurantism,  his  similar  implication  is  that,  more  than  just
fallacious, deconstruction amounts to charlatanry. I am suggesting that, contrary to the
dominant narrative of  American English departments,  there is  a bond between this
kind of repudiation and the challenge to aesthetic universality mounted by politically
minded  critics  in  the  sixties  and  seventies,  a  challenge  embodied  in  Raymond




as a concept” (Williams, 1977 45). In both cases, that of philosophy and literature, the
attempt to provide a comprehensive account of  one’s  undertaking,  an account that
could without prejudice also include versions unlike one’s own, gives way to a more
historically and culturally situated practice, one that acknowledges certain limits on
the  possibility  of  making  oneself  understood.  Although  I  have  been  convinced  by
Stanley Cavell’s account of these issues—by which I mean an account of literature and
philosophy in which the limits of knowledge are set by self-knowledge, both one’s own
and that of those with whom one wishes to communicate1—my aim is not to take sides.
It  is  to  understand these  limits  we have  confronted.  What  does  it  mean to  have  a
concept  that  I  routinely  apply,  calling  certain  things  philosophy  or  literature  as  a
matter of course, but that, as soon as I am challenged, I can neither define nor defend,
or not to any challenger’s satisfaction?
2  Section  §77  is  one  of  the  few  passages  in  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  Investigations
where, in his account of our conceptual knowledge, Wittgenstein takes up aesthetic
concepts directly—that is, where he addresses what it means for someone to know what
a portrait, plot, crescendo, or ode is (40-41). In the preceding sections (§67-§71), he has
described two ways  in  which we operate  with  concepts.  According to  the  first,  we
formulate context-specific rules for a concept, establishing definite boundaries on its
application, and in the second we express our conceptual knowledge unselfconsciously,
in an open-ended and improvisatory practice. Wittgenstein’s point is not that one of
these ways is superior. His point is that any concept will in different circumstances
require greater or less definiteness and also that, in the circumstances with which we
are most familiar, different concepts will ordinarily require greater or less definiteness.
In section §68 he says that we apply our concept of a number—that is, use the word
“number”—in both the rule-governed and open-ended ways, while we ordinarily use
the word “game” only in the second, and in a characteristically vivid image (§76), he
compares  these  two versions  of  conceptualization  to  two pictures,  one  of  which is
composed of colored squares with sharp edges and the other of colored squares with






3  Describing the sharp picture’s resemblance to the blurred as that of a definition to an
unselfconsciously deployed concept, Wittgenstein goes on in §77 to consider a third
version of conceptualization (see figure #2), one in which the blurred picture becomes




But if the colors in the [blurred picture] shade into one another without a hint of
any  boundary,  won’t  it  become  a  hopeless  task  to  draw  a  sharp  picture
corresponding to the blurred one? Won’t you then have to say: ‘Here I might just as




4  Wittgenstein’s implication seems to be that, were our concepts when unselfconsciously
deployed to lack all  definiteness,  their  application would appear so random that,  if
anyone failed to understand what I meant in calling something a game, no context-
specific  definition  would  seem  relevant.  And  then  comes  Wittgenstein’s  punchline:
“And this is the position in which […] someone finds himself in ethics or aesthetics
when he looks for definitions that correspond to our concepts.”
5  I have never been sure whether Wittgenstein intends this sentence as one of his gloomy
pronouncements on modernity, when in his view confusions are so endemic that much
of  fundamental  importance  goes  unrecognized,  or  whether  he  means  it  as  an
acknowledgment of how—not just during modernity, but at any time—our knowledge of
art and morality differs from our knowledge of numbers and games. Of course, there is
another  possibility,  one Wittgenstein may have in  mind in  sections  §122 and §129,
namely, that the confusions of our time are so endemic that, unless the operation of
our concepts is laid bare, affording us a view of their relations at any time, what is of
fundamental importance will go unrecognized. But, regardless of how or whether we
historicize it, Wittgenstein’s picture of our aesthetic concepts seems pretty unsettling.
His  implication  seems  to  be  that,  unlike  both the  sharply  defined  concepts  of
mathematics and the blurry concepts of play, our knowledge of music, painting,
sculpture,  drama,  film,  television,  architecture,  dance,  and  literature—at  least  as




remark occurs in that part of Philosophical Investigations where he rejects the idea that
everything grouped under a concept has one essential feature in common (§65), an idea
that was central to his earlier explanation of language in the Tractatus. Now he claims
that the various exemplifications of a concept are related to one another in the way the
members of a family are related, that is, by “a complicated network of similarities” in
which what we call a game or a number depends on its resemblances to other things we
call games or numbers (§66-§67). The idea is that no common feature explains why we
call  football,  chess,  and poker games,  not  because in reality they have no common
features, but because their various resemblances strike us as sufficiently obvious that
in ordinary circumstances we group them together as a matter of course, without need
for  greater  definiteness.  However,  in  circumstances  where  we  do  need  greater
definiteness,  that  is,  where  I  am unsure  what  my friend means  in  saying  that  her
marriage  has  turned  into  a  game,  a  context-specific  definition  can  usually  be
formulated. She might say, for example, “By a game, I just mean we’re always keeping
score,” or “It seems like a game because we’re both trying to win.” As Stanley Cavell has
shown, learning when such explanations are needed and how to provide them is part of
what we learn in learning a word (Cavell, 1969 1-43, 62-70). It gives our concepts their
distinctive shape.
6  Why then does Wittgenstein think that the family resemblances among art works are
insufficient to give a similarly recognizable shape to our aesthetic concepts? What is
lacking about my knowledge of what a theme, fugue, or tour jeté is, that my knowledge
of games provides? It is worth noting that in Philosophical Investigations the formlessness
that in section §77 Wittgenstein attributes to our aesthetic concepts seems to afflict all
of our concepts as soon as philosophy gets hold of them. Wittgenstein compares doing
philosophy to  forgetting what  one knows (§89),  losing one’s  footing (§107),  getting
turned around (§108), feeling disoriented (§123), becoming entangled in rules (§125), or
regressing to a primitive state (§194), and he thinks this alienation is likely to beset us
any time we try to define our concepts in circumstances where they require no greater
definiteness, that is, in the absence of any particular misunderstanding that context-
specific rules, definitions, or boundaries could straighten out. If, for example, I ask why
chess  is  called  a  game,  not  because  there’s  something  about  chess  that  I  do  not
understand, nor  because  I  fail  to  see  any  resemblances  to  football  and  poker,  but
because  I  want  to  know  how  the  concept  of  a  game  is  applied  at  any  time,  then
Wittgenstein thinks the boundary between chess and related concepts—say, warfare or
politics—rather than just blurry, will start to look artificial, as though corresponding to
nothing real. After all, is it really so obvious that moving the knight in chess resembles
kicking a ball at a goal more than deploying troops on a battlefield? When we look at
meaning in this way, Wittgenstein believes that our concepts will tend to merge, such
that—were I Raskolnikov and prepared to act on my philosophizing—as soon as you
reached for my queen,  I  might attack you,  and no rule of  the game of  chess could
convince  me  I  was  making  a  mistake.  What,  prior  to  philosophy,  looked  like  the
sharpest imaginable boundary, that between mere amusement and aggression, after
philosophy resembles an undifferentiated continuum, one on which games and wars
constitute  so  many  randomly  distributed  points.  Although  any  definition  might  be
imposed onto this picture, none fits it. In fact, it is just this lack of fit that philosophy
has seemed to expose.  In other words,  the effect of  doing philosophy, according to
Wittgenstein, is  to  make concepts  that  we ordinarily  apply as  a  matter  of  course—




look like  conventions,  habits,  and trained reflexes,  that  is,  like  actions we perform
merely as a matter of social conformity.
7  It now becomes somewhat clearer why Wittgenstein pictures our aesthetic concepts as
shapeless.  Unlike numbers or games, works of art—paintings,  musical  compositions,
novels, poems—have often raised questions about what our aesthetic concepts mean,
and  not  only  in  circumstances  where  their  resemblances  to  other  things  called
paintings, music, or literature have been less than obvious. When in 1884 Henry James
sets out to explain the art of fiction without recourse to the rules of Walter Besant or
the metaphysical strictures of French naturalism (James, 1986), he undergoes a loss of
footing  similar  to  what  Wittgenstein  describes  philosophy  producing  (Berry,  2003),
much as does Virginia Woolf forty years later when she accuses the novelists of Arnold
Bennett’s generation of substituting mere externals for the novel’s proper work. “It is
to express character […] that the form of the novel […] has been evolved,” she declares,
only to concede that she cannot say what, apart from externals, character is (Woolf,
1993  238).  A  similar  philosophical  disorientation  occurs  when  in  1927  E.M.  Forster
pronounces Gertrude Stein’s fiction a failure, claiming that “the basis of a novel […] is a
narrative of events arranged in time sequence” (Forster, 1927 30), a claim that Stein’s
account of temporality in “Composition as Explanation” (Stein, 1990) does not so much
challenge  as  sublime,  making  it  all  but  impossible  to  say  what  the  phrase  “time
sequence” means. And this list, if continued, could include Theodor Adorno’s quarrel
with Georg Lukács over the putatively fundamental status of narrative realism (Adorno,
1998), Roland Barthes’s challenge in Writing Degree Zero to Jean Paul Sartre’s placing
political boundaries on fiction’s development (Barthes, 1977), and the various debates
from the 1960s to the present over anti-novels, metafiction, the nouveau roman, magic
realism, Oulipian narrative, écriture feminine, and conceptual writing—to mention only
well-known cases. 
8  What  seems  most  striking  about  these  examples,  at  least  from  Wittgenstein’s
viewpoint,  is  that  in  none of  them do rules,  definitions,  or  boundaries  function to
straighten out misunderstandings, or not as they do in the case of games, that is, by
explaining how in a specific context a concept is being applied. On the contrary, no
party  to  the  disagreements  actually  appears  confused  about  whether  the  works  in
question are novels or not—at least no one hesitates to refer to them as novels—as
though the difficulty experienced by Besant, Bennett, Forster, Lukács, and Sartre were
less to recognize family resemblances than to ignore them, especially those that, if not
for  their  rules,  definitions,  and  boundaries,  might  appear  obvious.  However,  the
contrasting explanations offered by James, Woolf, Stein, Adorno, and Barthes seem so
lacking  in  definiteness  that,  were  there  any  real  misunderstanding—that  is,  were
anyone really confused about how to do with the works in question what people have in
the past done with novels—little they say about what a novel is would help. Instead, the
principal  effect  of  their  explanations  is  to  expose  the  artificiality  of  the  rules  and
definitions  put  forward  by  Besant  et  al,  transforming  the  novel’s  conventional
boundaries into what looks more like an undifferentiated continuum. In other words,
these  disagreements  appear  as  much  philosophical  as  aesthetic,  consisting  of
contrasting pictures of how at any time the concept of a novel is deployed. In the first,
the concept’s boundaries appear sharp precisely because they bear little or no relation
to how the word “novel” is actually used, while in the second, the boundaries appear so
blurry that hardly any novel could be said either to fit it or to fail to fit it. What seems




deployment,  a  picture  in  which,  despite  blurred  edges,  meaning  looks  sufficiently
definite—both  to  ourselves  and  others—that  misunderstandings  can  ordinarily  be
overcome.2
9  In Philosophical Investigations §77, Wittgenstein offers uncharacteristically direct advice
to all who, in aesthetics or ethics, find themselves in the predicament of James, Woolf,
Forster,  or  Stein—that  is,  in  circumstances  where  a  concept has  begun  to  look  so
formless, or its boundaries so artificial, that its meaning strikes us as questionable at
any time. Instead of trying to formulate definitions or rules, Wittgenstein tells us, we
should ask ourselves: “How did we learn the meaning of this word (‘good’ for instance)?
From what sort of examples?” (§77). The purpose of his advice is not to make what we
have in the past called paintings, music, or literature a limit on how we presently apply
these concepts, although Wittgenstein does take seriously our need to learn a concept
before changing it. However, his aim is not conservative. It is to prevent us, whenever
our aesthetic concepts are questioned, from constructing explanations satisfying to no
one, not even ourselves.  That is,  the problem in §77 is not that we lack definitions
sufficiently  expansive  to include  works  unlike  those  we  already  know.  It  is  that,
although we call various things novels as a matter of course, our explanations of what
we mean bear little relation to what strikes anyone as fundamentally important.  In
other words, the problem in §77 has less to do with the limits of our aesthetic concepts
than with their basis, the grounds to which we ordinarily take recourse, not to explain
why something is or is not a novel, but to explain why it is or is not a good one. When
Wittgenstein advises us to turn away from definitions and toward examples, his point is
that what we seem confused about is how we actually deploy our aesthetic concepts,
not just how we explain them, and when he specifies examples of the kind from which
we learned the terms of aesthetic judgments, his point is that, to overcome confusion,
our concepts must stop looking as they do when philosophy gets hold of them, that is,
as though their boundaries were artificial, corresponded to nothing real. That aesthetic
concepts change does not make them different from any other concepts. What makes
them different is that in circumstances like those in which James, Woolf, Forster, and
Stein  find  themselves,  specifying  a  family  resemblance  rarely  satisfies  anyone.  To
change an aesthetic concept, our deployment of it cannot look merely conventional. It
has to function as exemplary.3
10  When in “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” Virginia Woolf complains that the novelists of
her  generation  had  “no  English  novelist  living  from  whom  they  could  learn  their
business”  (1993  240),  she  does  not  deny—after  the  fashion  of  Rudolf  Carnap—that
Arnold Bennett is a genuine novelist, or even that he is a good one. Her point is that a
novel  like  Bennett’s  The  Old  Wives’  Tale differs  from  Tristram  Shandy and  Pride  and
Prejudice in the way that members of the novel family differ from novels from which
someone could learn the concept. She describes the difference as that between works
for  which  human  character  becomes  interesting  in  relation  to  something  else,  to
property or class or the economic system, and works for which character is, as she says,
interesting “in itself” (235, 240). Woolf’s idea seems to be that learning from novels of
the first kind is difficult, not because they are inferior, but because what makes them
interesting, what makes them good novels, has no necessary connection to what makes
them  novels.  It  is  as  though  applying  the  concept  to  them  were  a  matter  of  their
resemblance to things called novels in the past solely. Although by comparing such




definition, it would bear little or no relation to what seems of fundamental importance
for her, namely, what makes a novel like The Old Wives’ Tale worth reading. 
11  That in “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown” Woolf is never able to explain what she means
by character “in itself” poses no serious problem, since, if she is right about everyone’s
familiarity with the concept (238), all that is necessary for us to understand her are
examples. And the examples in To the Lighthouse—published three years after Woolf’s
essay—provide  a  sufficiently  definite  picture  of  what  she  means  (Woolf,  1981).
Something like what we have called character in the past—that is, a force in each of the
Ramsays  and  their  guests  that  tries  to  impose  itself  on  their  social  and  material
surroundings—seems to have moved into the novel’s foreground, displacing the action.
Or perhaps we will say that these manifestations of subjectivity just are the action, but
to understand why Woolf considers them fundamental, why she thinks “the form of the
novel”  evolved  specifically  “to  express  character”  (238),  we  will  need  to  find
questionable, cannot simply accept as a matter of course, that To the Lighthouse is over
two-hundred pages long. That is, in Woolf’s novel, character either expresses itself in a
moment, as when Mr. Ramsay lifts his head to stare at Lily or when Charles Tansley
boasts of never having been sick a day in his life, or else it expresses itself continuously,
as with Mrs. Ramsay’s proprietorial protectiveness of all males. What it does not do is
express itself as the inevitable culmination of a chronological development, as in, say, a
novel of education. Nothing could seem less inevitable, more accidental and arbitrary,
than that Lily Briscoe’s self-expressive act, her completing her painting, should occur
only  after the  death  of  Mrs.  Ramsay  or  at  the same  time  that James  reaches  the
lighthouse. Or in a sentence, the time required to read To the Lighthouse—its length—is
not a material analogue of the fictional time required for the completion of its action.
Why couldn’t Woolf’s novel be twice as long or fifty pages shorter?
12  I  want to say that, if  for some of us Woolf’s novel is exemplary of novelness,  that is
because,  even  though  neither  short  nor  long,  its  length  does  not  strike  us  as
conventional. In other words, its length is not explained by Woolf’s conformity to the
expectations of the majority of readers or by the familiar definition of a novel as a
fictional prose narrative that is long. On the contrary, the length of To the Lighthouse
shows what the expression of character means, how it is related to our concept of a
novel, not just in Woolf’s work, but at any time. To recognize this meaning, we need to
recall what numerous commentators have remarked,4 that Woolf’s narrative oscillates
between two distinct temporalities. According to the first, time is marked by constancy,
recurrence, and duration, merging at moments with virtual timelessness, while in the
second, time is fleeting, sentencing all creation to change, incompleteness, and decay.
These two temporalities are what Mrs. Ramsay senses in the rhythmic flashes of the
lighthouse—“It will end, it will end […]. It will come, it will come” (63)—and what she
hears  in  the  waves’  ceaseless  monotony,  “which  for  the  most  part  […]  seemed
consolingly to repeat […], ‘I am guarding you—I am your support,’ but at other times
[…] warned her whose day had slipped past in one quick doing after another that it was
all ephemeral as a rainbow” (16). What commentators have not so frequently remarked
is that conceiving time in these two forms cancels the first. In other words, the threat
to constancy and duration, to what seems timeless, is just that, in reality, it is only one
pole  of  a  rhythmic  oscillation,  merely  a  moment  in  time.  Acknowledging  as  much
makes the issue that Woolf’s novel must resolve—not so much at risk of becoming a bad
novel, but of becoming a novel only conventionally—that of why to continue. In other




the island and house and Ramsays, her painting is going to endure. On the contrary, as
Woolf tells us, “It would be hung in the attics […]; it would be destroyed” (208). In fact,
this  destruction,  which  assumes  the  foreground  in  the  novel’s  middle  section,
overtakes  everything  in  To  the  Lighthouse:  Mr.  Ramsay’s philosophy,  Mrs.  Ramsay’s
ageless beauty, Paul and Minta’s burgeoning love, even Lily’s aesthetic “vision,” which,
despite its momentary clarity, “a thousand forces did their best to pluck from her”
when painting (19). That no chronology in To the Lighthouse ever culminates in anything
lasting,  anything  timeless,  makes  the  boundary  between  its  story  and  a  random
distribution of moments appear artificial.
13  If continuing to paint, write, or read under such circumstances is to strike anyone as
meaningful, then the expression of character must somehow cancel time. Unlike Sophia
Baines’s elopement in Bennett’s The Old Wives Tale, which depends for its significance
either on Sophia’s circumstances later in the novel or on the historical circumstances
of young women generally, only moments the significance of which does not depend on
what comes before or after can make the two-hundred pages of Woolf’s fiction worth
traversing.  Lily  Briscoe  describes  such  moments  as  having  been “resolved  […]  into
simplicity” (160),  suggesting that they result  from some inessential  complication or
confusion being dispelled rather than from any significance being added. The idea is
that  whatever  makes  one  moment’s  relation  to  another  seem  merely  contingent,
whatever suppresses affinities that might otherwise look obvious, is what the character
of Mrs. Ramsay, with her beauty, imperiousness, and inept matchmaking—or perhaps
in spite of these characteristics, as she just sits writing letters under a rock—renders
immaterial. As Lily recalls, her own anger at Charles Tansley’s misogyny seemed to “fall
away like old rags” when Mrs. Ramsay looked over her spectacles at the two of them
skipping  stones  across  the  water  and  laughed  (160).  Whatever  we  are  to  call  this
“astonishing power that Mrs. Ramsay had over one” (176), Woolf makes clear its family
resemblance to the power that, even in changed circumstances—“as [Lily] walked along
the Brompton Road, as she brushed her hair” (157)—prevents Lily’s aesthetic vision
from being forgotten: “[A]nd there it stayed in the mind affecting one almost like a
work of art” (160). In both cases, relations that one comes to know merely in coming to
know  who  or  what  someone  or  something  is—Lily  calls  them  “simple,  obvious,
commonplace”  (52)—seem  to  have  been  momentarily  laid  bare,  and  despite  their
susceptibility to change and decay, restricting them to a definite time and place proves
difficult.  It  is as though her sense of Mrs. Ramsay’s character, of how “she brought
together this and that and then this” (160),  remained as fundamental to Lily’s  own
character  as  her  sense  of  distance,  shade,  mass,  and  line.  Even  years  after  Mrs.
Ramsay’s death, even after the war and Charles Tansley’s passing from her life, when
Lily resumes painting, she still “seemed to be sitting beside Mrs. Ramsay on the beach”
(171). 
14  And the length of To the Lighthouse threatens these revelations, rendering material our
suspicion  that  they  correspond  to  nothing  more  real,  more  lasting,  than  a  mood,
memory,  or  personal  impression.  What  Mrs.  Ramsay  calls  “a  coherence  in  things”
(105), the stable “shape” (161) that at moments Woolf depicts so vividly—“So that is
marriage, Lily thought, a man and a woman looking at a girl throwing a ball” (72)—
invariably undergoes alienation a moment or page later, detaching itself from present
surroundings and becoming the imposition of some character’s subjectivity: “but this
cannot last, [Mrs. Ramsay] thought, dissociating herself from the moment while they




proves  momentary  in  this  way,  is  constantly  being  dispelled,  that  every  new page
questions it, giving the novel’s length the same relation to what makes it worth reading
that  the picture in  figure #2 has  to  figure #1 and that  in  Philosophical  Investigations
philosophy has to all of our concepts. A shape or coherence that seems obvious while
under the power of Mrs. Ramsay’s character, begins to blur as the pages turn, merging
over  the  time  of  reading  with  before  and  after,  until  what  seemed  the  sharpest
imaginable  boundary,  that  between  the  significant  and  the  merely  forgettable,
resembles  an  undifferentiated  continuum.  The  fact  that,  unlike  Arnold  Bennett’s
novels, the action of To the Lighthouse culminates in no stable relations—that the bowl
of fruit whose colors and textures Mrs. Ramsay finds so satisfying gets disarranged a
sentence later (108-09)—makes both Woolf’s novel and the concepts we impose on it
seem amorphous, indefinitely malleable. And no explanation, no theory of character or
narrative, can bolster our confidence in them. For the question of why to continue—the
question Lily  asks of  painting,  “Why then did she do it?” (158)—no more wants an
explanation  than  Lily’s  question,  “What  is  the  meaning  of  life?”  (161),  wants  a
definition of the word “life.” What Lily’s question wants is an example of why she paints,
a recurrence of the moment when time stops and a world of significance materializes
before her eyes, here and now. In To the Lighthouse, everyone’s problem—Mrs. Ramsay’s,
Lily’s,  Woolf’s,  ours—is identical:  how to discover in temporal  relations what seems
fundamentally  important,  and  solving  it  means  recognizing  how  character  makes
fictional prose narratives that are long worth reading. Or not.
15  Near the end of Part One of The Claim of Reason,  Stanley Cavell makes the following
remark: 
If it is the task of the modernist artist to show that we do not know a priori what
will  count  for  us  as  an  instance  of  his  art,  then  this  task,  or  fate,  would  be
incomprehensible,  or  unexercisable,  apart  from  the  existence  of  objects  which,
prior to any new effort, we do count as such instances as a matter of course (Cavell,
1979b 123). 
16  I  want,  in  closing,  to  draw  two  conclusions  about  the  relation  of  literature  to
philosophy, both of which follow from Cavell’s remark. 
17  First, what it means to have aesthetic concepts that I apply as a matter of course but
that,  if  a  particular  application  is  questioned,  I  cannot  explain,  or  not  to  others’
satisfaction, is that, in a sense not equally true of numbers and games, our aesthetic
knowledge is comprised of examples. That others do not understand me, that they find
my explanation as confusing as what it is intended to explain, need not imply, as it
almost certainly would with the words “number” and “game,” that when speaking of
literature, novels, or character, I do not know, or have only a very blurry idea, what I
am talking about.  Although Woolf fails to explain what she means by character “in
itself,” it does not follow that, in differentiating her concept of a novel from Arnold
Bennett’s on this basis, she is being anything less than acute. On the contrary, when
reading To the Lighthouse, I feel quite confident she knows what she is talking about, and
if challenged, I can identify the bases of my confidence, citing examples from the novel
that differentiate character interesting in itself from character interesting in relation
to something else. However, if despite the definiteness of this explanation, or perhaps
because of it, others feel that my evidence is too limited, that no reliable conclusion
about  character  “in  itself”  can  be  drawn from Woolf’s  novel  alone,  then  a  further
difference from numbers and games is that citing more examples is unlikely to help.




do with any differences  in  our  aesthetic  judgments.  That  is,  we could be  trying to
determine what character means apart from any actual problem understanding Woolf,
in which case the only explanation likely to satisfy us will be how the concept is applied
at any time, making it look very blurry. However, if the cause of our disorientation is
aesthetic,  then just  like our aesthetic knowledge generally,  it  will  manifest  itself  in
examples.  Part  of  what  Cavell’s  remark  is  intended  to  bring  out  is  this  concrete
foundation underlying aesthetic disagreements. By interpreting the question of what
kind of thing a putatively aesthetic object is, not as a question of family resemblances,
but  as  a  question of  “what  will  count  for  us”  as  that  kind of  thing,  he  makes  our
aesthetic knowledge stand, teeter,  and fall  on the connection,  or lack,  between our
concept of a novel and our judging something to be—to count as—a good one. That a
single example can lay bare this connection, that a novel can function as exemplary,
means that my inability to make my application of aesthetic concepts understandable
may result, not from confusion or lack of training, but from seeing more in a particular
example than others see. And in such circumstances bringing our aesthetic practices
into conformity will prove as difficult as getting others to see what is of fundamental
importance to them or getting myself to forget what I have seen. 
18  And my second conclusion follows from this first, namely, that what it means to have
aesthetic concepts I apply confidently but that, if a particular application is questioned,
I can explain only by getting others to see what I see, is that, in a sense not equally true
of  numbers  and  games,  there  is  no  impersonal knowledge  of  literature.  Part  of
Wittgenstein’s point in turning us away from explanations and toward examples is that,
to the philosophical question of what gives our aesthetic concepts their shape, the only
frank answer is that I do. Only in relation to a concrete human subject, to what Woolf
calls human character, can a concept like literature, which begins to look blurry as
soon as we try to formulate its definition, be resolved into simplicity by examples of the
kind from which we learned it. But to concede as much makes aesthetic concepts seem
reducible to acculturation alone, as though unrelated to anything external, while the
point of philosophical questioning is to expose all such parochialism, reminding those
who use words like “literature,” “novel,” and “character” that, on the vast continuum
of  written  and  oral  narratives,  the  examples  from  which  we  learned  these  words
comprise only a handful of randomly distributed points. If, as Cavell implies, “what will
count for us” as an example of literature depends for its comprehensibility on examples
of just this limited kind, then instead of looking blurry, our concept begins to look
confining, almost as though logically circular. But Cavell’s paradox is that this same
“matter of course” deployment of the concept also enables a work like To the Lighthouse
to  show  us  that  “we  do  not  know  what  will  count,”  that  our  open-ended,
unselfconscious  use  of  words  like  “literature,”  “novel,”  and  “character”  signifies
nothing more than that those with whom we communicate do not ordinarily question
them. If anything counts as literature, that is not because others deploy the concept as I
do. It is because certain examples function for me as exemplary, laying bare what I 
mean, what is of fundamental importance to my using the word at any time. When Lily
Briscoe wonders, “Why then did she do it?” I  do not know whether she is asking a
philosophical or aesthetic question. That, as Wittgenstein remarks, “Explanations come
to an end somewhere” (Wittgenstein,  2009 6)  does not justify my failure to explain
myself, but it does redirect my attention toward examples, after which there is a great
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NOTES
1. The relation of self-knowledge to knowledge is arguably the overarching theme of Cavell’s
interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, but it becomes explicit in his account





2. Of direct relevance for the issues raised here is Cavell’s idea that “aesthetic judgment models
the sort of claim entered by […] philosophers” who, like Wittgenstein, “appeal to what ‘we’ say
and mean,”  and that  the  familiar  lack  of  resolution  in  aesthetic  disagreements,  rather  than
grounds for suspicion, reveals the kind of rationality that both aesthetics and this philosophical
appeal have. (See Cavell, 1969 86-96)
3. For  Cavell’s  use  of  the  adjective  “exemplary,”  see  1969  94,  178-79;  1979b  178.  In  Cavell’s
philosophy, learning what a concept means, both in the case of a child’s first acquisition of the
concept and also an adult’s later discovery of new ranges of application of it, is dependent on
applications that strike the learner as exemplary (1979b 168-180). Cavell’s account of the changes
in art effected by modernism turns on this idea that a single example of an aesthetic concept can
prove exemplary, that is, can disclose the concept’s meaning at any time (1979a 109-10).
4. For a recent example, see Sheehan, 2015.
ABSTRACTS
Before puzzling over some possible conjunction between literature and philosophy, one has to
agree on what such concepts mean. However, as soon as one wonders about their definitions,
concepts like “literature” or “the novel” on the one hand, or “philosophy” or even “concept” on
the other,  prove all  too elusive.  If  one thinks they know what a novel  is,  it  proves virtually
impossible  to  freeze  a  suitable  definition  of  the  aesthetic  concept.  The  reason  for  that
impossibility might be that philosophy’s mission, to the extent that it reflects upon concepts, is
somehow to  blur  them.  Yet  this  article  aims  to  show that  it  is  precisely  in  that  sense  that
literature, through the example of the novel, is in itself philosophical to the degree that what
defines  the  novel  is  a  self-reflexive  interrogation of  what  makes  it  so.  With  the  example  of
Virginia  Woolf’s  To  the  Lighthouse,  the  article  concludes  that  there  might  be  no  intrinsic
knowledge of our (aesthetic) concepts outside examples.
Avant de s’interroger sur une éventuelle conjonction entre littérature et  philosophie,  encore
faut-il s’entendre sur ce que recouvrent ces concepts. Or dès qu’on soulève la question de leur
définition, les concepts de « littérature » ou de « roman » d’un côté, de « philosophie » voire de
« concept » de l’autre, s’avèrent éminemment fuyants. Si on pense savoir ce qu’est un roman, en
arrêter  une  définition  acceptable  s’avère  quasiment  impossible.  La  raison  en  est  que  la
philosophie, en tant qu’elle s’interroge sur des concepts, a pour mission de les brouiller. Or, cet
article  vise  à  démontrer  que  c’est  précisément  en ce  sens que l’écriture  littéraire,  à  travers
l’exemple du roman, est philosophique, puisque c’est aussi le propre du roman, à l’instar de To the
Lighthouse de Virginia Woolf, de s’interroger sur ce qui le définit en tant que tel. De sorte qu’il n’y
a de connaissance possible que dans l’exemple. 
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